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Abstract
The recent growth of online recruitment and candidate management systems has established yet
another media for fraudsters on the internet. The ever-growing size of the candidate pool has
forced different industries to move to web-based candidate management systems. The
advantages of such web-based systems are substantial. On one hand, they are the best means to
filter through thousands of applicants for employers and on the other hand, the candidates find
themselves in a convenient position while applying for a position. People with fraudulent
motivations explore these systems to lure candidates in a hoax and extract sensitive information
(e.g. contact information) using fake job advertisements. In this paper, we analyzed a publicly
available dataset and used machine learning algorithms to classify job postings as fraudulent or
legitimate. The contribution of this research is the inclusion of contextual features in the feature
space, which revealed compelling improvements of accuracy, precision and recall.
Keywords: Online recruitment, Fraud detection, Employment scam, Online recruitment fraud,
Contextual features.

1.

Introduction

Online recruitment fraud (ORF) is one of the most serious problems in recent times on the
internet. Although the problem imposes serious threats on personal & social security and
privacy, it has not been addressed by the research community to the extent that matches the
demand of the severity. ORF is a form of employment scam where a person with fraudulent
intensions posts a fake job advertisement on an online platform targeting job seekers. Naïve or
desperate job seekers do not think about the legitimacy of the advertisement and end up
revealing personal information. This sensitive information is then used by the fraudsters in
many ways, compromising the privacy and security of the job seekers. According to an
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) report [1], a total amount of AUD
212,784 in Australia has been lost during the month of October 2017 alone, due to online
recruitment frauds. During that period, a frightening number of 237 employment scams were
carried out by fraudsters throughout the country.
There are even more severe consequences of ORF than financial loss. Sometimes the
fraudsters can even ask for sensitive information to be handed over to the potential employers
which can be used to conduct further criminal activities, such as money laundering, reshipping
fraud, identity theft and so on. A news report [2] published by Australian Broadcasting
Corporation portrays a shocking story of a young man who was convinced enough by a fake
job advertisement to send a copy of his passport, driver’s license and tax file number to someone
he thought, was a potential employer. The information that these documents hold is more than
sufficient to conduct an identity theft or a similar crime. Apart from simple contact information,
through ORF, people with fraudulent intentions can gather personal information such as home
address, educational background, work experience profile and other socioeconomic data and
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sell the consolidated dataset to third parties such as call-centres. Some scammers even ask for
money from the applicants at a later stage of a fake recruitment process as visa, travel expenses
or started-kit expenses.
Due to the structured nature of online recruitment advertisements, it is very hard to
distinguish fraudulent job advertisements from legitimate ones. Most of the online recruitment
sites have a specific skeleton for job postings that gives the fraudsters an advantage to blend in.
Sometimes, the differences are so insignificant that it is very hard to detect the fraudulent
advertisement even with human analysis. The lucrative financial offer, flexible work hours can
easily trick people into applying for a well-crafter job advertisement. Similar fraudulent online
behaviours have been heavily investigated by researchers in the information system domain [314]. Email spamming, phishing, cyberbullying, opinion fraud and many more, are problems
that are similar to ORF as they can be categorised as improper user behaviours on the web.
Nevertheless, the problem of ORF presents some challenges due to the lack of contextual
information on the recruitment sites and a very short time span of interaction between the user
and the system.
Existing methodologies for detection of ORFs [15,16] utilizes textual and structural
information from the job postings but fails to take into consideration, the importance of
contextual information about the organization that offers the job. The theoretical and practical
importance of contextual features about different actors, have been analysed by researchers in
different domains, such as cyberbullying detection [10,11], opinion fraud detection [3] and
crowdturfing detection [13,14]. In the case of recruitment fraud, the actor whose contextual
information plays an important role in successful detection, is the offering organization. The
contextual information includes organization’s history, reputation, internet footprint and so on,
which are described in the methodology section of this paper. Policy makers such as
government organizations also suggest job seekers to validate an organization’s legitimacy by
gathering these pieces of contextual information [17,18] before applying for a position
advertised by the organization. Popular job advertisement portals like SEEK 1 also suggest their
users to search the internet for a company’s footprint before applying for a job.
Keeping these insights in mind, our research focuses on a novel feature space design that
not only covers the textual or structural features but also analyses contextual features, in order
to improve the detection quality of ORF. The research uses the public EMSCAD dataset [19]
and classifies instances of recruitment circulars as fraudulent or legitimate based on the
proposed feature space. The learned model is analysed and evaluated using traditional data
mining metrics, such as accuracy, precision and recall.
The remaining paper is organized in the following sections: Section 2 discusses some
relevant research works, Section 3 elaborates the research methodology and proposed feature
space, Section 4 describes the experimental setup and evaluates the proposed model and Section
5 concludes the paper with remarks on the managerial implications of our work and future
improvement scopes.

2.

Related work

Research in the field of cybercrime and deception detection are more often than not, domain
specific. The generalized area consists of, but not limited to domains, such as phishing, email
spam, cyberbullying, Wikipedia vandalism, trolling, opinion fraud, astroturfing, malware
attack, cross-site scripting, online predation, financial fraud, identity theft, employment scam
and so on. It is outside the scope of this paper to cover previous research works in all of these
domains. However, in terms of related approaches, a number of research works [3-16] focused
on feature space design, natural language processing (NLP) and machine learning techniques,
which we cover in this section.
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The research work by Stringhini, et al. [3] designed a feature space based on empirical
analysis on social networks traits and trained a Random Forest classifier to detect email spam,
whereas Boykin and Roychowdhury [4] focused on extracting features from the message body
and message header for training a Bayesian classifier. Yeh, et al. [5] on the other hand, focused
on meta-heuristics to propose a feature space based on user behavior. The approach of
extraction of binary features from online text was adopted by Dinakar, et al. [6] to classify
YouTube comments to detect cyberbullying, whereas other researchers used NLP techniques
such as Term Frequency–Inverse Document Frequency (TF-IDF), lexical analysis and
syntactic-semantic analysis to detect improper behaviors such as phishing, Wikipedia
vandalism and cyberbullying [7,8,9]. User contexts of online social network (OSN) such as
gender information and user activity history were considered by several research works
[10,11,12], in the domain of cyberbullying and trolling. Group and individual contextual
characteristics were also utilized by several research works [13,14] to identify crowdturfing
groups on OSN. However, these approaches [3-14] of feature space design are not adequate for
ORF detection, as the categories of features, included in the feature space, largely depend on
specific problem domain. Additionally, the structured nature of online recruitment
advertisements begs careful consideration towards feature selection for successful fraud
detection.
To the best of our knowledge, in the domain of ORF or employment scam, one research
group conducted only two related research [15,16]. The research work done by Vidros, et al.
[15] analyzed the problem of employment scam for the first time. The authors explained, in
details, the workflow of hiring a candidate and the role of Application Tracking Systems (ATS)
within that flow. The authors also mentioned the severity of exploitation of such ATSs. Identity
theft, financial loss and loss of privacy were some of the main highlights of their motivation.
They drew the differences and discussed the similarities of recruitment fraud with some of the
highly studied problem domains such as email spam, cyberbullying, phishing, trolling and
Wikipedia vandalism. This research work listed some of the challenges of recruitment fraud
domain which include lack of adherence to any communication protocol, short and one-time
interaction of users with job advertisements and impersonation of fraudsters as an existing
business and so on. Their analysis of real-world workable data generated a set of empirical
rules.
In order to prove the hypothesis and applicability of the empirical ruleset, Vidros, et al. [16]
conducted a more comprehensive and extensive research. In this second stage of research, the
authors generated a real-life dataset of 17,880 instances of job ads where 17,014 were legitimate
and 866 were fraudulent. The dataset was made public by the authors and is known as the
EMSCAD [19] dataset. The authors conducted bag-of-word (bow) modelling and empirical
analysis on a subset of the EMSCAD dataset. Their empirical analysis on geographical
constraints, textual analysis of spam words, analysis of HTML elements and binary analysis
provided affective baseline information for ORF detection. The empirical ruleset generated in
the first paper [15] was expanded in the second [16] and served as a base for the ruleset based
binary features. They achieved a highest accuracy of 90.56%, recall value of 0.906 and
precision value of 0.906 using J48 decision tree classifier of WEKA for their binary analysis of
features.
Although Vidros, et al. [16] analyzed different aspects of the problem domain by taking
different approaches to model a solution for detection, the contextual features indicating
organization’s online profile were not considered by the authors. Also, due to the short span of
interaction between the user and the online recruitment systems, many aspects of the
recruitment advertisement itself, are usually ignored by the regular job seekers. To overcome
these challenges, our research considers the contextual attributes that gives an overall idea about
the advertising organizations, which are imperative to design a better detection tool. The next
section elaborates our research methodology for designing a novel feature space that takes into
account the contextual information about the organization’s background.
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Research methodology

Our research is mainly driven by the motivation of designing a feature space that can train a
learning model to detect an instance of job circular or advertisement more accurately. As
discussed in the related work section, to the best of our knowledge, the closest relevant research
we could find in the domain was the research conducted by Vidros, et al. [16]. This research
makes use of the EMSCAD [19] dataset that was made public by the authors of the paper [16].
The dataset contained 17,880 real-life job ads posted by Workable [20], a renowned online
recruitment portal. Each instance of the public dataset is labelled. Each record in the dataset
had a set of attributes and a binary class label indicating whether or not an instance of a job
circular is fraudulent. For each record in the dataset, a class label ‘t’ indicates a fraudulent job
posting whereas, class label ‘f’ indicates that the posting is a legitimate job advertisement. Apart
from the class label, there are 16 attributes pertaining to each record in the public dataset. The
values for these attributes for each record are either pure text, or text with HTML tags. Table 1
lists down all the fields and their short descriptions.
Table 1. Description of attributes in the EMSCAD dataset.
Name
Title
Location
Department
Salary range
Company profile
Description
Requirements
Benefits
Telecommuting
Company logo
Questions
Employment type
Required experience
Required education
Industry
Function
Fraudulent

Description
The title of the job circular
The geographic location of the job
Internal department of the organization
Indicative salary range
A brief profile of the company
A detail description of the job
Requirements of the job
Offered benefits of the job
True/False based on whether or not the job requires telecommunication
True/False based on whether or not the ad contains company logo
True/False based on the presence of screening questions
Type of employment (full-time, part-time, contract, etc.)
Level of experience (Executive, entry level, intern, etc.)
Level of education (Master’s, bachelor’s degree, etc.)
Specific industry (IT, healthcare, etc.)
Specific area of functionality (Engineering, research, sales, etc.)
Class label (‘f’ means legitimate job ad and ‘t’ means fraudulent job ad)

In our research, the principle idea behind the design of contextual feature space was to
mimic the human behavior while trying to validate the authenticity of a job circular. An initial
analysis of the dataset fields reveals that, it is quite challenging for a job seeker to decide
whether or not a circular is fraudulent just by looking into the field values, which are in terms,
a direct representation of the real-life job ads. Further investigation of the available government
and private online articles revealed some insight. For example, an article published by
Australian Government [17] strongly advices job seekers to search the internet for the company
website and other information they can find about the company that indicates towards the
reputation and dependability of the company as an organization. In Australian scenario, if the
job posting is made by an organization inside Australia, the Government also suggests checking
the Australian Business Register [18] for the company details. The idea is to have a way to
validate the existence of the company’s internet footprint. Also, instinctively, when we need to
find out something about an entity, whether or not the entity is an organization, the first place
we look for is the internet. Given the information availability provided by the search engines,
the existence of a company can be validated by a human in several minutes who has basic
knowledge of using the internet. If the corresponding employer of a job ad turns out to be an
invalid company, it is almost certain that the job ad is also invalid.
In order to acquire information about a company, the first thing we needed was the name
of the company. The EMSCAD [19] public dataset does not contain such information. Our
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approach to resolve this problem involved two significant steps. First, to extract a name for a
company from the text listed as company profile in the dataset. Second, to extract some
contextual information about the company using simple Google search.
The problem with the implementation of the idea is that the company name extraction
from text requires significant natural language processing efforts, as Named Entity Recognition
(NER) algorithms perform well with human names, not organization names. Moreover, due to
updated privacy policies of Google, Google Search API [21] now, has restricted flexibility and
lets the developer create search engines that can search only within a specific website, not the
entire web. Keeping these challenges in mind, we decided to keep the extraction process of
contextual features as manual and also keep a manual validation process for the output of the
name extraction algorithm, as a safeguard. The automation of contextual feature extraction will
be the primary objective of future extension of this work.
Due to the fact, that the manual extraction of features from the web requires significant
time and efforts, the convenient option was to work with a subset of the EMSCAD [19] dataset.
One major criteria for selecting the records from the entire dataset of 17,880 instances was the
presence of company profile as the name extraction algorithm was designed to work with
company profile text. The pre-processing program extracted a small subset of records and for
each record in the subset, the company profile field in the dataset was not empty. The Java
Collections class was used to randomise the records. The ratio between the positive and
negative instances was also kept within the 4:1 range. As a result, we ended up with a dataset
of 368 instances among which, 94 (~25%) instances were fraudulent records and 274 instances
were legitimate job ads.
In order to extract the name of the company, we used the Stanford CoreNLP [22] natural
language processing toolkit. The algorithm first parsed the HTML company profile using Jsoup
[23] and then used a combination of the Named Entity Recognition (NER) and Parts of speech
(POS) tagging libraries from the CoreNLP toolkit to come up with a name of the company.
Manual validation revealed that around 85% of the company names were extracted correctly
among the instances that had a valid company name within the profile text.
Before the population process of binary contextual features for our dataset, the company
website URL (if any), domain age, LinkedIn page URL for the company were extracted
manually for each of the records. The domain age was extracted using open source domain age
tool [24] which indicated how long the domain has been occupied by the company. The domain
age provided an indicative baseline to decide whether or not the website was recently created.
The rational for keeping the website age information was the tendency of the fraudsters to create
fake websites just before posting a fake job advertisement. Nowadays, the ease of creating
websites in a few clicks has increased the number of such fake websites where the company
does not actually exist, but the website does. Several news reports and government agencies list
these sorts of discrepancy [25,26]. Finally, to keep a track record of the fraudsters, the company
profile texts of fraudulent job ads were kept in a look-up table as fraudsters often tend to use
the same company profile for posting different fraudulent job advertisements. Fig. 1 shows a
summary of our contextual attribute extraction process.

Generation of
appropriate subset
of records

Extraction of
company profile
text

Extraction of
company name
from profile text

Fig. 1. Contextual feature extraction process.

Extraction of
contextual
features using
company name
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Based on gathered knowledge, discussions and feasibility analysis, we decided to include
the following binary features in our contextual feature space as part of our novel feature space
design:
• hasCompanyName: 1 if the name of the company is present in the profile text, 0
otherwise.
• hasCompanyWebsite: 1 if the company has a valid website, 0 otherwise.
• hasMaturedCompanyWebsite: 1 if the company website is older than 1 year, 0
otherwise.
• hasLinkedInPage: 1 if the company has a valid LinkedIn page, 0 otherwise.
• previouslySeenAsFraudulent: 1 if the job ad contains a company profile that was used
in a previously found fraudulent job ad within the dataset, 0 otherwise.
Apart from the above contextual features, other binary features were also considered
based on previous research of Vidros, et al. [16]. The features in the entire feature space were
divided into three major categories to differentiate between classes of features more precisely.
These categories are, textual features, structural features, contextual features, where the
contextual features are the highlights of the novelty of this work. The details of these features
are discussed in the experimentation section.
The machine learning toolkit used to conduct experiments was WEKA: Waikato
Environment for Knowledge Analysis [27]. Once the dataset was mapped into the binary feature
space, several classification algorithms, such as J48 decision tree, JRip rule-based classifier,
Naïve Bayes classifier were used from the WEKA toolkit. It is imperative to notice that the idea
behind using several classification algorithms was not to identify a superior one that fits the
problem domain better, but to validate the consistency and improvement of performance
measures across different experimental setup. Accuracy, precision and recall were the three
metrics that was used to measure the performance of the model for different classification
algorithms. The details about the performance of each of the classification algorithm are also
listed in the experimentation and evaluation section.

4.

Experimentation and evaluation

The experiments were conducted in two phases for each classification algorithm used. Each
phase was given a particular name to better differentiate between the obtained performance
measures. The difference between the two phases was the feature space of the training dataset.
Experiment A contained textual and structural features in the dataset of 368 instances, whereas
experiment B contained contextual features along with textual and structural features for the
same dataset. Apart from the difference in feature space, the experimental environment, i.e.,
algorithm used, algorithm parameters, were kept constant across the two experiments, for each
classification algorithm.
Table 2. Proposed binary feature space.
Feature
Class

Name

Description

Included in
experiments

containsSpamWord?

1 if the title or description contains a
spam word such as “easy job”,
“work from home”, etc. 0 otherwise

A, B

hasConsecutivePunctuation?

1 if title or description contains
consecutive punctuations (two or
more ‘!’), 0 otherwise

A, B

hasMoneyInTitle?

1 if title contains “money”, “cash”,
etc. 0 otherwise

A, B

hasMoneyInDescription?

Same as above

A, B

Textual

ISD2018 SWEDEN

hasExternalPrompt?

1 if description or requirement
contains external prompts such as
“follow the link”, “send resume at”,
etc. 0 otherwise
1 if description or requirement
contains personal email links, 0
otherwise

A, B

isTelecommuting?

1 if telecommuting is true, 0
otherwise

A, B

hasConsecutiveCappitalLetter?

1 if title or description contains
consecutive capital letters (10 or
more), 0 otherwise

A, B

educationLevelLow?

1 if required education level is high
school or equivalent, 0 otherwise
1 if bold text is present in
description, 0 otherwise

A, B

hasBoldTextInBenefits?

Same as above

A, B

basedInUS?

1 if location text contains US, 0
otherwise

A, B

hasCompanyProfile?

1 for each record of our version of
the dataset

A, B

hasCompanyLogo?

1 if company logo is present, 0
otherwise. Information is directly
acquired from EMSCAD dataset

A, B

hasJobIndustry?

1 if job industry is specified, 0
otherwise

A, B

hasScreeningQuestion?

Same as above

A, B

hasJobDescription?

Same as above

A, B

hasSkillRequirement?

Same as above

A, B

hasBenefits?

Same as above

A, B

hasShortDescription?

1 if description is less than 60 words
(4 standard sentences), 0 otherwise

A, B

hasShortCompanyProfile?

Same as above

A, B

hasShortRequirements?

Same as above

A, B

hasShortBenefits?

Same as above

A, B

hasHTMLListInRequirements?

1 if HTML list element is present in
requirement, 0 otherwise

A, B

hasHTMLListInBenefits?

Same as above

A, B

hasCompanyName?

1 if profile text contains company
name, 0 otherwise
1 if company has a valid website, 0
otherwise

B

hasMaturedWebsite?

1 if domain age is greater than 1
year, 0 otherwise

B

hasLinkedInPage?

1 if company has a LinkedIn page, 0
otherwise

B

previouslySeenAsFraudulent?

1 if a fraudulent ad was seen with
the same profile text, 0 otherwise

B

hasNonOrgEmailLinks?

hasBoldTextInDesciption?

Structural

hasCompanyWebsite?
Contextual

A, B

A, B

B

The pre-processing object-oriented program mapped each record of the dataset into a
binary feature vector. These feature vectors were then fed to each of the classification

MAHBUB AND PARDEDE

USING CONTEXTUAL FEATURES FOR ORF DETECTION…

algorithms with a 10-fold cross validation. The cross-validation process randomises the training
and test set for each of the folds. Table 2 lists the entire feature space totalling 30 binary features
including textual, structural and contextual features along with the information about the
corresponding experiments they were used in. The table does not list the binary class label.
For J48 decision tree classification, a 10-fold cross validation process with the training
dataset revealed an accuracy of 79.62% for experiment A (without contextual features). The
precision and recall values for class label ‘t’ (fraudulent) were 0.651 and 0.436 respectively.
On the other hand, for J48 decision tree classification, a 10-fold cross validation with the same
training dataset yielded an accuracy of 94.29% for experiment B (with contextual features in
the feature space). The precision and recall values for class label ‘t’ (fraudulent) were 0.910
and 0.862 respectively. Experiments conducted with JRip rule-based classifier and Naïve Bayes
classifier also demonstrated significant improvement of performance measures for experiment
B over experiment A. Table 3 lists the confusion matrix for experiments A and B for all three
classifiers.
Table 3. Confusion matrix for experiments A and B for all three classifiers.
Predicted class in experiments
Actual class

J48 experiment A

J48 experiment B

f (legitimate)

t (fraudulent)

f (legitimate)

t (fraudulent)

f (legitimate)

252

22

266

8

t (fraudulent)

53

41

13

81

JRip experiment A

JRip experiment B

f (legitimate)

246

28

268

6

t (fraudulent)

57

37

8

86

Naïve Bayes experiment A

Naïve Bayes experiment B

f (legitimate)

236

38

221

53

t (fraudulent)

59

35

8

86

As it can be seen from the confusion matrix, for J48 (experiment A), a total of 53
fraudulent job advertisements were incorrectly classified as legitimate (false negative) whereas,
22 instances of legitimate job postings were incorrectly classified as fraudulent (false positive).
The confusion matrix explains the low precision and recall values for class label ‘t’ for
experiment A. For experiment B with J48, a total of 13 fraudulent job advertisements were
incorrectly classified as legitimate (false negative) whereas, only 8 instances of legitimate job
postings were incorrectly classified as fraudulent (false positive).
For experiments with J48 decision tree the number of false negatives was reduced from
53 to 13 from experiment A to experiment B. On the other hand, the number of false positives
was reduced to 8 in experiment B from 22 in experiment A. Moreover, the accuracy increased
up to 94% in experiment B from only 79% in experiment A. The value of precision and recall
for class label ‘t’ also increased from 0.651 to 0.910 and 0.436 to 0.862, respectively. These
measures clearly demonstrate that the inclusion of contextual features such as company’s
website information, existence of LinkedIn page and so on, makes a significantly positive
impact on the outcome of the model and detects more fraudulent instances compared to the
feature space without them. Fig. 2 illustrates the differences in performance measures obtained
in experiments A and B across different classifiers.
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(a) Accuracy (%)
100
95

94.29

(c) Recall

(b) Precision
1

96.19

1

0.935

0.91

0.9

0.9

83.42

85

0.7

73.64

75
70

0.619
0.569

0.6

76.9

0.7

0.651

79.62
80

0.479

0.5

JRip

Naïve Bayes

0.6
0.5

0.436

0.394

0.4

0.4
J48

0.915

0.8

0.8

90

0.915
0.862

0.372

0.3
J48

Experiment A (without contextual features)

JRip

Naïve Bayes

J48

JRip

Naïve Bayes

Experiment B (with contextual features)

Fig. 2. Difference in performance measures for experiment A and B across three classifiers.
(2a) Accuracy, (2b) Precision and (2c) Recall

For both JRip rule-based classifier and Naïve Bayes classifier the accuracy, precision and
recall values also improved significantly from experiment A to experiment B. JRip performed
the best among the three classifiers yielding an accuracy of 96% for experiment B and Naïve
Bayes showed the least impressive results for experiment B yielding an accuracy of 83%,
although it is a major improvement over 73% of accuracy in experiment A. The precision
values for class label ‘t’ improved from 0.569 to 0.935 and 0.479 to 0.915 for JRip and Naïve
Bayes, respectively. Similarly, the recall value for class label ‘t’ increased from 0.394 to 0.915
and 0.372 to 0.915 for JRip and Naïve Bayes, respectively.
The performance measures of classifiers used in this research cannot be directly
compared with the performance measures of the similar research done by Vidros, et al. [16], as
the experiments use different subsets of the EMSCAD dataset and the pre-processing
techniques are bound to be different. Hence, we evaluate our model based on the performance
measures of two different experiments (A and B) as the differences clearly demonstrates the
importance of contextual features in the feature space.
As mentioned earlier in the research methodology section, the purpose of conducting
experiments using different classification algorithm was not to identify a superior one for the
problem domain, rather to present a scenario that demonstrates the consistent improvement of
performance of classifiers, when the contextual features are included in the feature space. The
results obtained by conducting the incremental feature space expansion from experiment A to
experiment B clearly manifests our claim that the contextual feature space improves the
detection performance of online recruitment fraud.

5.

Conclusion and future work

The cloud-based recruitment platforms are one of the most used platforms on the internet. With
the ever-increasing number of users of these platforms, personal and financial risks are
increasing as well, making the platform vulnerable to threats. Although extensive work has
been done in similar areas of research to study fraudulent user behavior (as discussed in the
related work section), the domain of ORF needs considerable attention from the research
community due to the gravity of impacts it bears on privacy and security. The limited
information within the scope of a recruitment advertisement itself, also poses a challenge. New
directions need to be explored to enrich the collection of features that are considered by a
learning algorithm to successfully detect a fraudulent job advertisement.
In this paper, we have proposed a novel feature space to improve the detection accuracy of
ORF. Previous works [15,16] in the domain did not address any contextual features outside the
scope of a job advertisement itself. Our proposed feature space considered these contextual
features which resulted in a significant increase in terms of accuracy, precision and recall of
multiple classifiers. The proposed feature space has been well-structured into different feature
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classes which makes the future extensions easy and manageable. The introduction of such
contextual features can potentially pave way for a new dimension of research in the domain of
ORF detection.
The methodology proposed in this paper can have a major impact on numerous job
advertisement portals that exist in the present era of internet. If more intelligent backend
filtering systems can be implemented on these portals, based on the research methodology
proposed in this study, more fraudulent jobs will be detected in the filtering stage. This will
prevent regular users from accidentally revealing their personal information by applying for
jobs that do not actually exist. Hence, to mitigate the risk of privacy and security, it is essential
to develop intelligent systems embedded within these cloud-based recruitment platforms. Our
research takes a step closer towards such intelligent filtering system.
The future improvement scopes for our research includes the extension of feature space
with more classes of features. However, the primary objective for our future extension would
be to automate the extraction process of contextual features by designing custom search
engines. Once the contextual feature extraction process is automated, it will then be feasible to
validate the importance of contextual features more accurately using the entire EMSCAD
dataset. Future automation process will also address the threats of validity of our proposed
feature space. Network information and user behavior analysis can add more value in the future
works as well. Moreover, the generation of large scale data sets with network and user level
information can facilitate further research, which is essential to tackle this relentlessly
increasing problem.
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